Cyrenaic Epistemology

Wyatt Mondry, Spring 2002

In this paper I will defend the Cyrenaic epistemological position. I will begin with an outline of the Cyrenaics position. Following this I will give the two main arguments that the Cyrenaics use in support of their position, the relativity of perception argument and the privacy of experience argument. I will conclude by entertaining and answering several possible objections that may be brought forth against the Cyrenaics. I will not be considering cases of a priori knowledge due to the constraints of this endeavor.

The Cyrenaic position

The Cyrenaics claim that we can have knowledge only about our immediate sense experiences, only the pathê are apprehensible. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.215) pathê are affections or experiences. By claiming that only the pathê are apprehensible the Cyrenaics believe that we are only capable of knowing our experience. "The pathos which occurs in us reveals to us nothing more than itself." (Against the Professors VII.194) The Cyrenaics affirm that external objects have an inapprehensible nature; they are not capable of being known. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.215) For example, if I experience cold when I go outside, then it is true that I am experiencing cold or cold is an affection that I am having while outside. This does not mean that 'it is' cold outside, rather that it 'seems' or 'appears' to me to be cold outside.

The Cyrenaic position does not hold that external objects do, or do not exist or that they are, or are not a certain way. (Against the Professors VII.194) I believe that they leave open, though they do not discuss, the possibilities of an evil deceiver or our brains in a vat constructing our sense experiences. However, since they speak only of external objects, so will I. What they hold is that we are not equipped to know the nature of external objects. Instead of apprehending external objects, the Cyrenaics posit that each external object gives rise to, or causes, an apprehendable pathos within the observer. The Cyrenaics conclude that we can only know the pathê.

There are two main arguments that the Cyrenaics use to support their claim that we can know only the pathê. (Against the Professors VII.191) They are the relativity of perception and the privacy of experience argument; I will discuss each in turn.

Relativity of Perception Argument

The Cyrenaics use the relativity of perception argument to show that because the same object can cause different perceivers different sense experiences, and because we have no criterion outside of our experiences with which to compare our experiences and determine which is veridical, we cannot know which qualities an object possesses. The Cyrenaics claim that it is possible to assert infallibly, truly, firmly and incorrigibly that we are being soured or being chilled, but it is not possible to affirm that that which produces our affection in us is sour or is cold. (Against the Professors VII.191) This is because there are times when we may be soured or chilled by the same object, when we interact with it in different ways. Thus, we are unable to determine the qualities of the object. For example, sometimes after brushing our teeth in the morning and then going and having a glass of orange juice, we experience the orange juice being sour. The Cyrenaics claim that we cannot affirm that the orange juice has the quality of being sour because if we ate a donut before drinking the orange juice we would experience the orange juice being sweet. If sweetness were a property of orange juice, then even after brushing our teeth we should expect the orange juice to retain its property of being sweet and arise in us the experience of sweetness. However, we know that this is not the case. The claim is that if we seriously consider the content of our experiences we will find that properties cannot be in external objects because our different experiences of the same object can result in the same object possessing different conflicting properties. Thus, the Cyrenaics would be unwilling to assert that the orange juice is any particular affection but that it can cause us to have many different affections.

Privacy of Experience Argument

The privacy of experience argument can be found within Against the Professors (VII.169).

Each person is aware of his own private pathos, but whether this pathos occurs in oneself and in one's neighbor from a white object one cannot tell oneself, since one is not submitting to the pathos of the neighbor, nor can the neighbor tell, since he is not submitting to the pathos of that other person. Each of us only has access to our own experience and not to that of any other person. So the mere fact that both my neighbor and I may call the car 'white' does not mean that my neighbor and I are in fact experiencing the same 'white'. And since no pathos is common to us all, it is hasty to declare that what appears to me of a certain kind appears of this same kind to my neighbor as well; for perhaps I am constituted to be whitened by the external object when it comes into contact with my senses, while another person has the senses constructed so as to have been disposed differently. (Against the Professors VII.197)

Even in cases where everyone agrees that, for example, the piece of paper is white, we can say that we have a common name but not that we have a common experience. This is not to say that we cannot compare experiences or discuss them, simply that we do not have a common experience. This view plays on the relativity of perception argument and claims that our unique perceptions give rise to unique experiences that we are unable to share in their entirety and richness to others. Instead, we are forced to communicate our unique private experiences through the medium of the senses, which will cause those who perceive them in their own unique way a separate experience that then has to be communicated back to the original source for verification. In other words, too many filters are in way to verify precisely what each person is experiencing. My mind will never see through your eyes to be able to verify that our common name, white, refers to a common experience; that what we name the same, appears the same.

The Cyrenaic epistemology is fairly straightforward. Only the pathê are apprehensible, external objects are not apprehensible. The relativity of perception and the privacy of experience arguments seek to show that external objects are not apprehensible because the "evidence coming from them (the pathê) is not sufficient regarding assertions about external objects." (Against Colotes 1120C-1121E) The result is that we can have knowledge only about our immediate experiences.

Objections

I will first address the objection put forth by Aristocles against only the pathê being apprehensible. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion on how one can live as a Cyrenaic and why it is better to live as a Cyrenaic.

Objection: Aristocles

Aristocles, quoted by Eusebius (Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18.31-91.7), raises an objection to the Cyrenaic position against the notion that only the pathê are apprehensible.

These philosophers (the Cyrenaics) maintained that they know absolutely nothing, just as if in a very deep sleep; for they say that when they are burnt or cut, they know that they are undergoing something. But whether the thing which is burning them is fire or that which is cutting them is iron, they cannot tell. One would ask whether they know at least, that they are undergoing and that they are sensing something. If they did not, they would not even be able to say that they know only the pathos; but again, if they do know this, then it is not true that only the pathê are apprehensible, for 'I am being burnt' is a locution, not a pathos. Aristocles' argument is as follows:

P1: If the Cyrenaics did not know that they were undergoing and sensing something, then it is false that only the pathê are apprehensible.

P2: If the Cyrenaics knew that they were undergoing and sensing something, then it is false that only the pathê are apprehensible.

P3: Either the Cyrenaics knew or they did not know that they were undergoing and sensing something.

C: Therefore, it is false that only the pathê are apprehensible.

 The first premise relies on the Cyrenaics position that only the pathê are apprehensible. If the pathê are not apprehensible, then we don't know when something is happening to us. Aristocles is stating that if a person is not aware that she is undergoing and sensing something, then she won't even know that she is having an experience. The second premise argues that if a person is cognizant of her pathos, then she knows something more than the pathos. Knowing something about the subject of the sensation is more than knowing the sensation.

Aristocles seems to want to separate the subject from the sensation and claim that when we undergo and sense something we know both the sensation and the subject. The distinction may be made clearer. Aristocles is distinguishing between simply sensing and transferring that sensing into a statement about sensing. A person feeling chilled is not the same as that person making the utterance 'I feel chilled.' Aristocles believes that in making the utterance, a person goes above and beyond just the pathê, they are claiming to know something about themselves, or put an identity on the sensation (I), as well as knowing the sensation (chilled). The result is that in knowing they are sensing something they extend their knowledge beyond only the pathê. Thus, it is false that only the pathêare apprehensible.

I don't believe that this sort of argument fatally harms the Cyrenaics' position. The Cyrenaics seem to be aware of this sort of concern and I believe they address it in Against Colotes 1120C-1121E, "when opinion stays close to the pathê it preserves its infallibility, but when it oversteps them... it often both disturbs itself and fights against other people..." The proposition, p, I have the experience of coldness, is distinct from the proposition, q, the experience of coldness occurs. However, with regard to the Cyrenaics' position, both p and q stay close to the pathê. That is, proposition p does not stray from the pathê. It is an opinion that is a direct consequent of being aware of ones own state. I believe that the Cyrenaics can claim a proposition such as p, without undermining their position that only the pathê are apprehensible. I don't believe that they would make the separation that Aristocles does between the subject and the sensation on the basis of the quote given above. The Cyrenaics would distinguish instances of experience where the subject is aware and is not aware of their pathos. If one is aware of what they are experiencing, then that experience may count as an instance of knowledge. If one is not aware, then the experience may not count as an instance of knowledge. The Cyrenaics would not want to claim, I think, that the pathos is necessarily knowledge. The claim, as I understand it, is that only the pathê can be considered knowledge. This is distinct from claiming that all pathê are knowledge. This latter claim seems too strong, as it would include experiences one undergoes while unconscious or in deep sleep. This seems problematic, as we normally do not believe that we can acquire knowledge while unconscious. However, we do retain knowledge while unconscious or asleep by virtue of our memory. All of this is consistent with the Cyrenaic position.

The Cyrenaics do make a claim that may be somewhat controversial, but that I believe is right on target. The claim in question is that the pathê are infallible. One might ask why we should believe that all pathê are infallible? The response is simply that one cannot mount an attack on another's perceptions due to the privacy of experience and the relativity of experience. The truth of your perceptions insofar as you perceive them extends to dream-like states, brains in a vat, evil deceivers and the actual world (if one exists). If I taste sweet, I do not care if it is in a dream, if it was constructed by my own mind or any other means; I taste sweet. If we extend this perception out to make claims about things, such as the X is sweet, then I do not preserve my infallibility.

Objection: The impossibility of living as a skeptic

The final objection that I would like to consider is the objection that it is impossible to live as a skeptic. The claim is that if one can know nothing about the way that things actually are, then it will be impossible to do, or accomplish anything. For example, what reason would I have to leave my house, or how would I even be able to leave my house if I knew nothing about how to leave, or how to operate a door or anything else? These sorts of criticisms have been leveled against the skeptics in an attempt to show that a skeptical life would be impossible to live.

I think that these claims are easily overcome by the Cyrenaic position. That I know nothing other than my pathê does not mean that I don't want to have more experiences. It does not mean that I will not be able to function in the world. It is not necessary to assume an external world to be able to navigate in the perceived world. There may be no world, as in the case of the evil deceiver, yet my pathê will still allow me to navigate through it. My experiencing the door is enough for me to figure out how to navigate through it. I don't need to know if the door is, or is not actually there, if it is, or is not actually brown, if I need to turn the handle to open it or if I can just push it open. I can navigate through the door by my immediate door-like experiences. For example, sometimes I think that I need to push a door to leave a building. I think that I know how the door operates. If I get to the door and push it, and it does not open I am not helpless because I don't know the characteristics of the door or because I was wrong in my thinking. I simply revert back to the fundamental way in which I began interacting with the world: I experience it. I may try to pull the door open, I may look for a handle or a switch; I may think it is locked or possibly a false door, I may try to break it down, or I may ask somebody for help. My lack of knowledge about something or my belief that I may never know something (like how to open a door) does not prevent me from interacting and navigating around my environment with success. The apparent causal chain that I interact with is predictable based upon my pathê, not in and of itself. My memory of my pathê is sufficient for me to construct a causal chain. The causal chain is useful only as far as my pathê correspond with how things seem to be. In this way I navigate and function through my perceptions of how things seem to be and why they seem to work.

Cyrenaics: A better life

I believe that the Cyrenaics would claim, and I agree, that their philosophy, if taken seriously, allows one to avoid much of the pain, confusion and disagreement that often arise among people and within people. Why do people disagree? They disagree because they each think that they know something. They both think that they are right in their observations, their schooling and so forth. When I see a creature flying at dusk and exclaim to my friend, 'Wow, look at that bat!' and he says 'are you looking at that bird?' we both believe that we are correct in our perceptions. Which one is correct? If we take the Cyrenaic position, we should say that it could be either or neither, in fact, it is beside the point to even argue about it being a bat or a bird, and instead we should continue to enjoy each other's company, if indeed we were. Why do people become confused? They become confused when something happens that does not line up with what they think should have happened. If one abandons her expectations, then how can one become confused? Why do we experience pain most often? Is it because we are thinking about how we wanted things to be and then became sad when they became something else? Is it remembering the past and how much more we liked it then compared to now? The Cyrenaics would tell you to dismiss your thoughts about the past and future. Instead of thinking about what will happen, what can happen, what ought to happen because in the past it did happen one way, that we should just concentrate on what is happening now, in the present, without thinking about it any further. After all, what else do we really know but our present experience? "Grief or joy are totally empty notions because of the manifest indeterminacy of things." (PHerc. 1251 On Choices and Avoidances, col. III) The past is done with and cannot be changed, the future is uncertain and there is much beyond our control. How is our skepticism livable? I think that the Cyrenaics should respond that their way is one of the few, if only way, to truly live because they live in the only time available to a person, the present. The Cyrenaics do not concern themselves with that which cannot be changed or that which is beyond their control but rather focus on what pleasures they can know, now in the present. They focus on their experiences, their pathê, that occur presently and the pleasure that they can bring.

Conclusion

The Cyrenaic position has had many detractors, both past and current, for a number of reasons. I have tried to offer what I think are plausible replies to objections that can be raised against the Cyrenaics. I believe that the Cyrenaic epistemology has many strong points and few weaknesses. I think that their knowledge claims are sound and that what we have available to us is an excellent starting point to fully develop a robust epistemology.

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